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SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEYS' FEES AFTER 
BUCKHANNON BOARD & CARE HOME, 
INCORPORATED V. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
Mark C. Weber* 
On May 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Incorporated v. West Vir-
ginia Department of Health and Human Resources. 1 The Court 
ruled that in order to be a "prevailing" party entitled to attor-
neys' fees under civil rights fees provisions, the claimant must 
prevail before the court in a judgment on the merits or a con-
sent decree. 2 The Court rejected the "catalyst theory," previ-
ously adopted by all but one of the regional circuit courts of ap-
peals,;1 which permitted the claimant to obtain fees if the 
lawsuit was the catalyst for a voluntary change in the defen-
dant's conduct. Accordingly, it denied attorneys' fees in Buck-
hannon's case on the ground that the case ended in a dismissal 
for mootness after the state repealed the rule the plaintiffs had 
challenged as a violation of two civil rights laws. 4 
Ever since the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 
19865 overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. 
Robinson,6 federal law has permitted parents to obtain attar-
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. Columbia; J.D. Yale. Professor Weber is 
the author of Special Education Law and Litigation Treatise (LRP Pubs. 1992 & 2d ed. 
2002). Thanks to Andrea Kayne Kaufman for comments on a draft of this paper. 
Thanks also to Janet Brewer and Victoria Napolitano, DePaul College of Law Class of 
2001, for their research assistance, and to Sara Mauk for additional research. Special 
thanks to Sarah Redfield and the participants in the Eighth Annual Education Law 
Institute at Franklin Pierce Law Center for providing a sounding board for many of the 
ideas presented here.© Mark C. Weber 2001. 
1. 532 U.S. 598, 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001). 
2. !d. at 1840. 
::l. See id. at 1839 n.3, 1852, nn. 4-5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
4. !d. at 1838. 
5. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. ~ 
1415(i)(3)(B)-(G) (West 2001)). 
6. 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (barring attorneys' fees in special education case). 
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neys' fees for prevailing in administrative and judicial proceed-
ings in special education cases. Because courts usually con-
strue all civil rights attorneys' fees provisions in a similar 
manner, the Buckhannon case will have important implications 
for special education litigation. Many special education cases 
are resolved without any formal decision from a judge or hear-
ing officer. Frequently, the parent files a due process com-
plaint, and the school district, under the pressure of a sched-
uled hearing, reviews the child's situation and provides the 
program or services that the parent sought for the child or 
drops its plans to change the child's program or placement. The 
parent then withdraws the request or the hearing officer dis-
misses the case as moot. In other instances, the school district 
makes a due process hearing request to initiate a student 
evaluation or special education services without the parent's 
consent but withdraws the request after the parent makes 
clear that she will put up a defense at hearing. Under the law 
prior to Buckhannon, the parent is entitled to attorney's fees in 
those instances and can file suit to obtain an award even with-
out requesting any other relief. 7 But if Buckhannon bars fees in 
special education cases resolved without an adjudication on the 
merits or a consent order, the school district will no longer have 
to pay that parent's counsel fees. 
This change in the law would work a significant realloca-
tion of litigation resources from parents challenging school dis-
tricts to the districts. 8 Moreover, parents wishing to obtain fees 
and districts wishing to avoid fees are likely to alter their be-
havior to maximize their respective advantages. Both the po-
tential shift of power in special education disputes and the 
strategic maneuvering likely to accompany it need further 
study. Although there has been significant scholarship on spe-
cial education attorneys' fees, 9 the catalyst theory, 10 and civil 
7. See e.g. McSomebodies v. San Mateo City Sch. Dist., 8H7 F.2d 971 (1989) (es-
tablishing that action may be brought solely to obtain fees). 
8. As students of law and economics have noted, attorneys' fees are simply an-
other item of relief, and if the plaintiffs right to obtain them is limited, seltlements 
will be biased downward. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of" Rule 68, 15 
,J. Leg. Stud. 93 (1986). 
9. The most comprehensive discussion in the law review literature is Thomas F. 
Guernsey, The School Pays the Piper, But llow Much?: Attorneys' Fees in Special Edu· 
cation Cases After the Handicapped Children'., Protection Act of ID86, 2:-l Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 237 (1988); see also Mark C. Weber, Special Education Law and Litigation 
Treatise ch. 22 (LHP Publications 1992 & supp. VIII 2000) (chapter discussing atior-
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rights attorneys' fees in general, 11 the Buckhannon case has al-
tered the legal terrain sufficiently to justify a new look. 
This paper will describe the catalyst theory in Part One, 
discuss Buckhannon's abolition of that theory in Part Two, con-
sider the applicability of Buckhannon to special education liti-
gation in Part Three, list some strategic implications of the ap-
plication of the case to special education disputes in Part Four, 
and map out a number of policy implications of applying the 
case to special education litigation in Part Five. 
I. THE CATALYST THEORY 
For a generation, courts have held that civil rights claim-
ants may recover attorneys' fees when they prevail in the sense 
of achieving what they want from the litigation, even if the 
case itself ends in a dismissal for mootness, a voluntary dis-
missal, or some other disposition that does not constitute a 
courtroom victory. The claimants prevail when the litigation 
has been the "catalyst" for a change that provides the relief the 
ncys' fees in special education cases); Peter C. Hughes, Attorneys' Fees for Administra· 
tiue Proceedings Under the HCPA and Contingency Enhancements, 58 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 909 (19~)()); Sheila K. Hyatt, The Remedies Gap: Compensation and lmplementa· 
tion Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 689, 728<ll (19~!0); Myron Schreck, Attorneys' Fees for Administratiue Proceed-
ings Under the Education of the Handicapped Act: Of Carey, Crest Street and Congres· 
sional Intent, 60 Temp. L.Q. 59!!, 639-50 (1987). 
10. See .Joel H. Trotter, The Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights Fee Shifting After 
Farrar u. Jlobby, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1429 (HJ94); Martin Patrick Averill, Comment, "Spec· 
ters" and "Litigious Fog"2: The Fourth Circuit Abandons Catalyst Theory in S-1 & S-2 
by and Throur:h P-1 & P-2 u. State Board of Education of North Carolina, 73 N.C. L. 
Rev. 2245 (UJ95). Commentary specifically on Buckhannon's overturning of the catalyst 
theory includes: Adam Babich, Fee Shifting After Buckhannon, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 10137 
(2002); David Arkush, Note, Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom of 
Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virr:inia 
Department of Health and Human Services, :{7 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131 (2002); 
Caroline L. Curry, Recent Deuelopments, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 727 (2001); Note, Leading 
Cases, 115 Harv. L. Hev. 457 (2001); see also Mary D. Fan, Case Note, 111 Yale L..J. 
1251-52 (2002) (describing Buckhannon as "a recent example of the Supreme Court's 
mounting disregard for legislative history .... "). 
11. See e.g. Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attar· 
ney's Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1~!43 (1998); Keith Hyl-
ton, Fee Shifting and lncentives to Comply with the Law, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1069 (1993); 
Bernard l'. Cocld, Comment, Grossly Excessive Attorney's Fee Requests under the Civil 
Rir:hts Attorney's Fee Awards Act: Should the Entire Fee Request Be Denied?, 24 U. 
Bait. L. Hev. 119 (EJ94); Davirl Shub, Note, Priuate Attorneys General, Prevailing Par· 
ties, nnd Public Benefit: Attorney's Fees Awards for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 42 Duke L.,J. 
706 (l ~HJ2). 
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claimants sought, even though there is no adjudication. Relying 
on language in the legislative history of the 1976 Civil Rights 
Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 12 courts concluded almost immedi-
ately after the passage of that law that civil rights plaintiffs 
could obtain fees in the absence of a judgment from a court if 
t~ey 
1
prevailed in obtaining what they sought from the litiga-
tion. 
The catalyst theory gained strength from comments in vari-
ous Supreme Court cases saying it was settled law that fees 
were available if the litigation vindicated the claimant's civil 
rights, even in the absence of a formal judgment in the claim-
ant's favor. 14 In 1994, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals determined in S-1 v. Board of Education15 that the cata-
lyst rule was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Farrar v. Hobby. 16 For its part, Farrar entailed only the propo-
sition that a minor victory on one of twenty claims did not 
make the plaintiff a prevailing party; accordingly, nine other 
courts of appeals considered Farrar irrelevant to the issue and 
reaffirmed the catalyst theory despite S-1. 17 At the time of the 
12. H.R. Rpt. 94-1558, at 7 (Sept. 15, 1976) ("[A]fter a complaint is filed, a defen-
dant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice. A court should still award fees even 
though it might conclude, as a matter of equity that no formal relief, such as an injunc-
tion, is needed."); see Sen. Rpt. 94-1011, at 5 (.Ttme 29, 1976), ("For purposes of the 
award of cotmsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate 
rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief."). 
13. See e.g. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279-81 (1st Cir. 1978). ,Justice 
Ginsburg's dissent cites eleven other court of appeals decisions predating the Supreme 
Court's Hewitt u. Helms decision, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987), which tmsmprisingly de-
scribed the "catalyst theory" as "settled law." Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1852 n. 4 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The only circuit not to adopt the catalyst theory was the 
Federal Circuit, which did not have the opportunity to consider the issue. See id. at 
1851. 
14. Ilewitt, 482 U.S. at 760 (describing entitlement to fees as "settled law" in 
situation where "voltmtary action by the defendant ... affords the plaintiff all or some 
of the relief sought," and reserving question when catalyst theory justifies fee award); 
see Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 102, 111 (1992) (also recognizing rule). 
15. 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
16. 506 U.S. 103. 
17. Stanton v. S. Berkshire Regl. Sch. Dist., HJ7 F.ad 574,577 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Morris v. West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. l~J99); Payne u. Bd. of 
Educ., 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. HJ96); Ma.rbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 
1995); Kilgour v. Pasadena, 5:~ F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Zinn. u. Shalala, 35 
F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-52 (lOth Cir. HJ94); 
Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Aut h., 21 F.3d 541, 546-50 (:1d Cir. 1994); Little Rock 
Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski City Sch. Dist. No. 1, 17 F.:3d 260, 268 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994). The Su-
preme Court mqjority opinion vindicated those courts in some measure by noting that 
Farrar is irrelevant to the catalyst thteory's validity. See Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 
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Buckhannon decision, the catalyst theory was alive and well 
everywhere except the Fourth Circuit. 
II. THE BUCKHANNON DECISION 
Buckhannon, an operator of assisted living residences, re-
ceived an order from the West Virginia state fire marshal to 
shut down its facilities because some of its residents were so 
disabled that they could not get to an emergency exit without 
assistance in the event of a fire. 18 Buckhannon argued that it 
could provide the necessary help in evacuating the residents 
and that failure to modify the rule constituted disability dis-
crimination.19 Buckhannon sued20 under the Fair Housing Act 
Amendments of 198821 and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) of 1990.22 The court awarded Buckhannon a temporary 
restraining order against enforcement of the provision and 
then extended that relief under an interim agreed order. 22 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their damages claims in the 
face of defendants' sovereign immunity defense but defeated 
the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim for permanent in-
junctive relief. 24 Less than a month after denial of the defen-
dants' motion, the state legislature repealed the rule under 
which the fire marshal had acted. 25 The court granted the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss the case as moot, though it sanc-
tioned the defendants for multiplying plaintiffs' expenses bls 
failing to notify them of the imminent repeal of the rule. 6 
Plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees, contending that the suit 
motivated the legislature to change the rule, but the court de-
nied the motion under the then-unique rule of the Fourth Cir-
Jil:iH n.4. 
18. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at lil39. 
HJ. Id. 
20. Co-plaintiff with the facilities operator was 102-year-old Dorsey Pierce, one of 
the residents who could not exit without assistance but who apparently wanted to con-
tinue to live in the less restrictive environment of an assisted living facility rather than 
a nursing home or institutional setting. See id. at 1850 (Ginsburg, ,J., dissenting). 
Presidential history buffs (or perhaps those looking for bad omens for the plaintiffs) 
may note the <Hid conjunction of Pierce and a homophone of Buchanan. 
21. 42 U .S.C.~~ :1601-:3607 (1994). 
22. 42U.S.C.§§ 12101-12213(HJ94). 
2:1. /3uckhan.non, 121 S. Ct. at lil:i8. 
21. !d. at l8:1H n. 1, l8GO (Ginsburg, .J., dissenting). 
25. Jd.atl850. 
26. !d. at 18:lH n. 2. 
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cuit that fees are available only when there is a judgment, con-
sent decree, or settlement. The court of appeals affirmed, and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 27 
The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. The Court reasoned that fees are available only to 
civil rights claimants who are "prevailing" parties, and that the 
term "prevailing" means one who has been awarded some relief 
by the court. 28 A legal dictionary and language used in earlier 
cases supported the definition. 29 Although a consent decree jus-
tifies fees on the ground that it is a judicially-ordered change in 
the legal relationship between the parties, success without ju-
dicially-sanctioned change does not justify fees. The Court 
found the language in earlier cases approving the catalyst the-
ory unpersuasive and similarly rejected language in the legis-
lative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. :JO 
Finally, the Court discounted predictions by the plaintiffs that 
defendants would intentionally moot cases to avoid fees and 
hence diminish the incentives for civil rights litigation, noting 
that no empirical evidence had emerged from the Fourth Cir-
cuit to support those results; the Court also weighed the poten-
tial harm against the possibility that fear of fees may keep 
some defendants from settling cases. 31 Justice Scalia wrote a 
concurrence, joined by Justice Thomas, dilating on the meaning 
of the term "prevailing" and on the risk of settlements "ex-
torted" by the fear of fees awards. 32 
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer.33 She stressed the extensive precedent 
from the circuit courts supporting the catalyst theory and con-
tended that "prevailing," if interpreted in a practical sense and 
in the sense found in previous Supreme Court cases, means ob-
taining what the party sought, even without a judgment.:34 She 
27. ld. at 1839. 
28. ld. 
29. ld. at 1839-40. 
30. ld. at 1841-42. 
31. ld. at 1842. The Court noted the limits on mootness doctrine and the desir-
ability of avoiding satellite litigation over fees. !d. at 184:-l. 
32. ld. at 1843-48 (Scalia, .J., concurring). Justice Scalia further disparaged the 
post-S-1 circuit court cases as instances in which the Supreme Court's dicta had misled 
the courts.ld. at 1849. 
3:-l. ld. at 1849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
34. Id. at 1851-53. Justice Ginsberg also relied on a Supreme Court case, Mans-
field, C. & L.M.R. Co. u. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 ( 1884), in which a cost award, whkh 
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argued that the legislative history provisions found unconvinc-
ing by the majority were "hardly ambiguous" and evinced clear 
congressional intent to interpret the term "prevailing" in a 
practical way that embraces the catalyst rule.35 She rejected 
the majority's policy arguments, suggesting that far from in-
ducing defendants to resist change in order to avoid fees 
awards, the catalyst rule provides an incentive for defendants 
to act promptly to avoid additional fees liability. The factual 
determination whether the lawsuit motivated the change is no 
more difficult than other factual determinations, and the role of 
the district court is to insure that fees are not awarded when 
the case lacks enough legal merit to have motivated the defen-
dant to change its ways to avoid an unfavorable court deci-
. ~6 
SlOn. 
III. BUCKHANNON'S APPLICABILITY TO SPECIAL EDUCATION 
LITIGATION 
Buckhannon did not involve the attorneys' fees provision in 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the 
statute that establishes the rights at issue in most special edu-
cation cases.=17 Nevertheless, an observer needs little foresight 
to predict that many courts will be inclined to apply Buckhan-
non to special education disputes. Not only do the courts typi-
cally construe all civil rights attorneys' fees provisions in a like 
manner,
38 but also the Fourth Circuit first departed from the 
catalyst theory in a special education attorneys' fees case. 39 Al-
though the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Fourth 
Circuit's decision, it endorsed the result. 
In response, it may be argued that the IDEA fees provision 
would be available only to a prevailing party, was given to a party that did not succeed 
in court. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1853-54 (Ginsburg, .T., dissenting). The majority 
distinguished the case by stating that the Court must have used its discretion to award 
costs to the party that did not prevail on accotmt of the "legally successful whipsawing 
tactics" of its opponent. !d. at 1811 n.8 .• Justice Ginsburg further supported her practi-
cal definition of the term with treatises and state cases regarding costs. !d. at 1855 
(Ginsburg, ,J., dissenting). 
:l5. !d. at 1857-58. 
:lG. !d. at 1859. 
:17. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 et seq. (West 2001) 
:)8. See llensley v. Eckerhart, 4Gl U.S. 424, 433 n. 7 (1983). 
:l~J. See S-1, 21 F.:ld at 19. 
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was adopted ten years after the original Civil Rights Attorney's 
Fees Awards Act of 1976, at a time when Congress was well 
aware of the wide use of the catalyst theory and long before the 
Fourth Circuit's rejection ofthe theory. The catalyst theory was 
so well-recognized that Strom Thurmond and Orrin Hatch 
sponsored bills to overturn it in 1985 and 1987. As Senator 
Hatch declaimed to the Senate in 1985: 
Due to the protracted nature of some litigation, a claim may 
be rendered moot by State and Federal legislation enacted 
prior to judicial resolution of the conflict. Under existing case 
law, such a turn of events would not preclude a recovery of at-
torneys' fees where a court determined that the case was a 
catalyst for the legislative change. 40 
Despite Senator Hatch's effort to illustrate what he saw as 
one of the fatal flaws in the catalyst theory, both his and Sena-
tor Thurmond's bills were unsuccessful. 
Congress might be said to have acquiesced in the lower 
courts' adoption of the catalyst theory, and by failing to make 
an exception to the theory when it adopted the IDEA provision, 
Congress enacted the catalyst approach. Notably, the IDEA 
provision does create exceptions to several other constructions 
of the civil rights attorneys' fees laws by barring multipliers 
and bonuses and creating an elaborate administrative offer of 
judgment rule. 41 By failing to act as it did in those instances, 
Congress adopted the widely understood construction of the 
term "prevailing" in the attorneys' fees provision. 
However persuasive that argument may be, a skeptic would 
reply that Buckhannon itself concerned two fee provisions that 
were also adopted well after the passage of the 1976 Act, at a 
time when the catalyst theory was well established and pre-
sumably well known to Congress; yet the Buckhannon opinion 
does not even bother to discuss the argument of Congressional 
acquiescence. That oversight may have been a result of the 
Court's rush to complete its business before the end of the 
term,42 and it is of course possible that the Court might revise 
its position if it were to consider the argument soberly. None-
theless, the Court's complete omission of the topic provides lit-
tle encouragement to those who would make a congressional 
40. 131 Cong. Rec. 810800-01 (daily eel. Aug. 1, 1985). 
41. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C)-(D)(i) (West 2001). 
42. The opinion came down May 29, 2001. 
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acquiescence argument in a special education attorneys' fees 
case. 
It remains true that the argument that Congress intended 
to adopt the existing construction of "prevailing" in the Handi-
capped Children's Protection Act is stronger than the argument 
implicitly rejected with regard to the ADA and Fair Housing 
Act Amendments, for those latter statutes did not include pro-
visions rejecting various other extant interpretations of section 
1988.48 The failure to reject the construction of "prevailing" 
thus looks more intentional with regard to IDEA than with the 
other two statutes. Whether courts will credit that distinction 
remains uncertain. 
If the courts do apply Buckhannon to special education 
cases, the application could be either broad or narrow. The 
facts of Buckhannon are extreme in that a legislative change in 
the law mooted the case, and legislative motivation is notori-
ously difficult to discern. 44 Some members of the legislature 
may have acted to moot the case, others because they believed 
in the merits of the position being adopted, others because of 
logrolling or political considerations, and still others because 
they hit the wrong button on their desks. A decision by a spe-
cial education director to provide requested services to a spe-
cific student, say a decision taken immediately after a settle-
ment conference and memorialized in an enforceable, written 
document such as an Individualized Education Program (IEP), 
is a much clearer instance in which the litigation led to there-
sult without adjudication. Buckhannon's facts do not require 
the denial of fees in that utterly dissimilar situation. Nor would 
an analogy to the case require denial of fees for relief written 
into a new IEP after a mediation session or in a stipulation to 
dismiss that does not amount to a consent decree. 
43. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § :l613(c)(2) (1994); Americans with Dis-
abilites Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (1994). 
44. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) ("[l]t is extremely difficult 
for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie 
behind a legislative enactment."). On occasion, however, the Supreme Court has scru-
tinized legislative motivation and found statutes tmconstitutional on account of ille-
gitimate purposes. See e.g. llunter u. Underwood, 171 U.S. 222 ( 1985) (finding enact-
ment tmconstitutional on account of racially discriminatory motivation); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. :J:l9 (1960) (same). See generally .John Hart Ely, Legislatiue and 
Administra.tiue Motiucttion in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L .• J. 1205 (1970) (discussing 
necessity of discerning legislative intent in many instances and problems with doing 
so). 
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The Court's language, however, suggests a much broader 
application of the case. At various points, the majority opinion 
says that fees are not available unless the party has been 
"awarded some relief by the court," unless there has been a 
'judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the 
parties," and unless there is a 'judicial imprimatur on the 
change."45 The crucial "unless" is that unless Buckhannon is 
strictly limited to its facts, it would bar fees awards in the 
situation posited above however clear the defendant's motiva-
tion might in fact have been. 
15. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1839-40. Preliminary indications are that courts 
are applying Buckhannon to special education cases, in some instances taking the 
Court's comments broadly. See e.g. J.C. u. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d !19 (2d Cir. 
2002) (overturning award of fees when hearing officer dismissed due process hearing as 
moot after district made changes in IEP and dropped expulsion proceedings); Jose Luis 
R. u. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist. 204, 2002 WL 54544 (N.D. Ill. .Jan. 15, 2002) (de-
nying fees for settlement agreement reached at mediation following hearing request, 
when agreement had been read into record before hearing otlicer without statement of 
approval by hearing officer); .John 7'. u. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 2001 WL 
l:'l91500 (Nov. 7, 2001) (denying fees when action ended in voluntary dismissal by 
plaintiffs); J.S. u. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 165 I<'. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (deny-
ing fees when defendant paid child's tuition at private school and reimbursed parents 
and parents did not pursue due process hearing request to resolution); Baer u. Klag-
holz, 786 A.2d 907 (N .• J. Super. Ct. 2001) (denying fees for hours spent challenging 
regulations that defendant ultimately amended without court order or consent judg-
ment); see also Akinseye v. D.C., 2002 WL 522883 (}).D.C. Mar. 19, 2002) (denying in-
terest on previous fee awards for settlements on basis of Buckhannon, but expressing 
reservations about wisdom of application of Buckhannon to IDEA administrative pro-
ceedings). But see Johnson u. D.C., 190 F. Supp. 2d 34,15 (D.D.C. 2002) (not extending 
Buckhannon to bar fees for private settlements of IDEA cases during a<lministrative 
proceedings); Brandon K. u. New Lenox Sch. Disl., 2001 WL 1491199 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 
2001) (denying motion to dismiss fees claim when settlement reached before hearing 
was transcribed and entered into due process hearing record as agreed order of hearing 
officer); Christina A. u. Bloomberg, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D.S.D. 2001) (awarding fees 
based on settlement agreement approved by district court with retention of jurisdic-
tion, though recognizing agreement not to be formal consent decree); Sabatini v. Corn-
ing-Painted Post Area Sch. Dist., 190 F. Supp. 2d 509 (W.D.N.Y. 20()1) (awarding fees 
when action terminated in settlement agreement incorporated in consent order, follow-
ing entry of preliminary injtmction); see also L.C. v. Waterbury Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 
519715 (D. Conn. Mar. 21, 2002) (awarding fees despite argument based on Buckhan-
non when hearing officl~r ordered residential placement but parents chose not to enroll 
child). The .Johnson court ruled that a district's consistent policy or practice of condi-
tioning settlement officers on fee waivers may constitute a violation of TDEA. ,Johnson, 
190 F. Supp. 2d at 42-18 (denying motion to dismiss cha!Jenge to policy but denying 
request for immediate injunctive relief). 
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IV. STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF APPLICATION OF BUCKHANNON TO 
SPECIAL EDUCATION CASES 
If Buckhannon reaches special education disputes and is 
applied in a broad fashion, it will affect the parties' litigation 
strategies, both with regard to their settlement postures and 
the claims they make and defenses they assert. 
A. Settlement Dynamics 
Application of Buckhannon to special education attorneys' 
fees would affect the dynamics of settlement negotiations. For a 
rational school district, a dollar spent on attorneys' fees is the 
same as a dollar spent on services for a child. A rational but 
impecunious parent must balance the need for educational ser-
vices for her child against the need to pay the family's bills. If a 
school district can plausibly threaten to moot the case and thus 
eliminate all entitlement to fees, that threat will induce a ra-
tional parent to sign a formal settlement for a lesser amount of 
services or other relief as long as settling the case now will pro-
vide some cash to pay the parent's attorney or at least elimi-
nate additional payments for the attorney's services. Thus a 
change in the fees entitlement can be expected to work a 
change in posture of both sides of the dispute and a reduction 
in the relief that parents obtain in settled cases. 
With regard to a more narrow aspect of litigation strategy, 
application of Buckhannon would diminish the parent's incen-
tive to pursue mediation, an option that the law currently en-
courages.41; Although the parent would retain some incentive to 
pursue mediation in order to dispose of the dispute promptly 
and stop amassing legal bills, a new incentive would exist for 
parents and their lawyers to keep the dispute alive through the 
hearing in the hope of obtaining relief and with it an entitle-
ment to fees. 
B. Asserting Claims and Defenses 
If Buckhannon governs special education attorneys' fees, 
the impact will not be limited to settlement dynamics but will 
also affect the framing of special education claims and the de-
fenses that school districts raise against them. The obvious de-
46. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (West 2001) (establishing procedures to implement 
and encourage use of mediation of special education disputes). 
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fense to consider is that of mootness, and the relevant claims 
include those for specific relief and for damages. 
1. The M ootness Defense 
In actions initiated by parents, school districts may volun-
tarily provide the child with the relief the parents sought and 
then seek to dismiss the case on the ground that it is moot. 
Courts in the federal system and in most states refuse to decide 
moot cases.47 If Buckhannon is applied to special education at-
torneys' fees, parent attorneys can be expected to resist moot-
ness dismissals with new vigor. 
Two doctrines may assist the parents' effort. The first doc-
trine is that the mere voluntary cessation of illegal activity 
does not moot a case if the defendant remains free to resume 
its actions. This is the familiar rule of United States u. W. T. 
Grant Co. :48 even if the defendant has changed its ways under 
the threat or reality of litigation, there remains a viable case 
for injunctive relief to keep the defendant in line. However, 
there must be some probability that the defendant will in fact 
return to its old ways. 49 
The second, independent doctrine that limits mootness dis-
missals is that an action remains alive when the conduct at is-
sue is capable of repetition yet evades review in the course of a 
typical proceeding. The most familiar application of this doc-
trine is a case challenging the constitutionality of abortion re-
strictions. By the time the case is adjudicated, the pregnancy 
will have ended. The Supreme Court has held that the events 
do not moot the case in those circumstances, for otherwise the 
case will never be adjudicated.50 Nevertheless, the repetition-
yet-evasion-of-review must apply to the party actually before 
the court. In a special education case challenging a disciplinary 
suspension, the Court permitted the case to proceed on behalf 
47. See e.g. Smith v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 184 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 1999) (dis-
missing IDEA claim for services as moot when student had moved); N.Y. St. Sch. Bds. 
Assn. v. N.Y. St. Ed. of Regents, 619 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (dismissing 
challenge to regulation after change in regulation). 
48. 345 u.s. 629 (1953). 
49. See e.g. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1975) (finding challenge to 
transfer of prisoner moot); Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Mettzer & David L Shapiro, 
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal System 219-220 (4th ed., 
Foundation Press, Inc. 1996) (collecting additional cases). 
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). 
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of one student on the ground that there was a reasonable prob-
ability he would again be subject to suspension51 but held the 
case moot as to a second student who had graduated and was 
no longer eligible for public school services.52 
The degree of success that parents will have in resisting 
mootness dismissals is one of the areas of uncertainty with re-
gard to Buckhannon's application to special education disputes. 
School districts can be expected to argue that changes they 
make in an IEP create an enforceable document that effectively 
ends a controversy. Parents can be expected to argue that the 
IEP is subject to change by the school district at any time on 
any ground, real or pretextual. Satellite litigation will ensue 
over the permanence of the changes in the program. Claims for 
compensatory education53 or monetary relief"4 also keep a case 
from being considered moot, though many special education 
cases lack the grounds for those claims. The availability of 
damages relief is discussed at greater length below. 55 
2. Claims for Specific Relief 
Until now, the advice for lawyers eager to obtain fees has 
been to resist making extravagant claims for specific relief, 
such as improved programs or placements, on behalf of a stu-
dent. Frequently, courts weigh what the parent originally 
sought ~~ainst what she obtained and reduce the fees propor-
tionally,·' so it makes sense not to make outlandish demands in 
the first place. This advice may no longer hold because the 
more restrained the request for relief, the easier it is for the 
district to moot the case and eliminate fees altogether. Of 
51. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-23 n. 6 (1988). 
52. Id. at 318. Not bound by the federal approach to mootness, a state court has 
applied a broader exception to conventional mootness rules, refusing to dismiss a case 
challenging disciplinary procedures on the ground that the conduct complained of was 
capable of repetition yet evading review with regard to other students. Bd. of Trustees 
u. Doe, 508 S.2d 1081 (Miss. 1987). 
53. Mason v. Schenectady City Sch. Dist., 879 F. Supp. 215 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 
54. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. u. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995). 
55. See infra text accompanying notes 59-65. 
56. See e.g. AndrewS. v. Sch. Comm., 59 F. Supp. 2d 237 (D. Mass. 1999) (award-
ing reduced fees when parents obtained staff and teacher training but not private 
placement). Some courts have denied fees altogether when parents achieved minimal 
success after making more extreme demands. See e.g. Linda W. u. Ind. Dept. of Educ., 
200 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 816 (2000) (denying fees when par-
ents won compensation for tutoring but failed on main tuition reimbursement claim). 
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course, if the parent throws caution to the wind in framing her 
request for relief, the district may be able to reduce fees liabil-
ity by using the offer of judgment rules 57 or making motions to 
dismiss parts of the claim. 
3. Damages Claims 
A pending claim for damages relief keeps a case from bein~ 
moot, as Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized in Buckhannon. 
Although the range of special education cases in which parents 
can obtain monetary relief is limited, Buckhannon gives par-
ents an inducement to push the limits and add money claims to 
keep the case from becoming moot. Hearing officers generally 
deny that they have the power to afford any damages relief 
other than tuition reimbursement, so a dispute that includes a 
damages claim will remain alive at least up through the filing 
of an action in court. Districts may be able to counter the 
prayer for damages by using the offer of judgment rules to limit 
fees liability to that incurred prior to an offer that is at least as 
good as what the parent ultimately receives through litigation, 
but the damages strategy affords at least some prospect of fees 
if not of cash relief itself. 
The federal circuits are in disarray as to what factual predi-
cates support damages claims beyond tuition reimbursement,59 
but courts have permitted compensatory damages awards for 
conduct such as educational neglect,60 failure to provide acces-
sible facilities,61 violations of procedural rights,62 and disability 
57. See 20 U.S. C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) (West 2001); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. 
58. See Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1842 ("[S]o long as the plaintiff has a cause of 
action for damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the case."). 
59. See Mark C. Weber, Damages Liability in Special Education Cases, 21 Rev. 
Litig. 83, 84-92 (2002) (collecting and discussing authorities). In order have a claim for 
tuition reimbursement (as opposed to compensatory damages), the parent must have 
expended money for private schooling in a situation in which the school district failed 
to make a free, appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner. 
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (West 2001); see Florence County Sch. Dist. 4 v. Carter, 
510 U.S. 7 (1993) (discussing reimbursement relief under IDEA). 
60. See e.g W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding claim for dam-
ages for alleged delay in evaluation and placement of child with disabilities). 
61. See e.g. McKay v. Bd. of Educ, 1997 WL 816505 (D. Me. 1997) (denying motion 
to dismiss damages claims for failure to make school building accessible). 
62. See e.g. Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(permitting action for damages when defendant allegedly forged form, preventing exer-
cise of procedural rights). 
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harassment. 6:3 Many courts allow such claims whenever there is 
a supEorted assertion of bad faith conduct or gross misjudg-
ment. '4 More claims of this type should be anticipated as par-
ents and their advocates push for more effective relief and try 
to stave off mootness in the meantime. 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING BUCKHANNON TO 
SPECIAL EDUCATION CASES 
Loss of an entitlement to judicial relief is a reallocation of 
resources. Parents who lose the opportunity to obtain fees 
when the litigation causes a school district to provide relief 
prior to adjudication will be out of pocket for the attorney fees. 
Thus, they have less of an incentive to pursue their rights un-
der IDEA, and attorneys who hope to be paid have less of an 
incentive to take special education cases. 
The loss is particularly acute when parents have the choice 
of purchasing educational services for the child on the open 
market for a set number of years before either high school 
graduation or age twenty-one (and the loss of IDEA eligibility), 
or continuing within the public education system and fighting 
the inevitable legal battles to procure acceptable special educa-
tion services. The parent with scarce resources can spend the 
money on private tuition and forgo her rights under the law, or 
she can incur the expense of an attorney on the prospect of get-
ting the services from the school district and the now-
diminished prospect of obtaining fees on account of getting the 
services via adjudication or consent order. Since a dollar spent 
on tuition is equal to a dollar spent on an attorney, the parent 
may well choose to give up the right to a free education to en-
sure that the child actually receives necessary services. The 
policy effect of the abolition of the catalyst rule is the loss of 
cost-free schooling for children with disabilities. 
As indicated above, in cases that are formally settled, there 
63. See e.g. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999) (denying motion to dismiss 
damages claim in which teacher allegedly humiliated student with severe depression 
and excluded her from academic activity). See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability 
Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1079 (2002). 
64. This test is frequently applied for damages claims under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S. C.§ 794 (1994). See e.g. Walker v. D.C., 969 F. Supp. 
794 (D.D.C. 1997) (permitting liability); T.J. W. v. Bd. o{ Educ., 26 IDELR 999 (M.D. 
Ala. 1997) (same); see also Thompson v. Bd.o{ Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574 
(8th Cir. 1998) (applying test but denying liability). 
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will be a similar dynamic in which the parent is induced to 
trade relief for the child against payment of legal bills. The 
higher the fees, the stronger the incentive to settle for some 
amount in cash to cover them even if it means less in the way 
of services for the child. Again, the child's right to free, appro-
priate public education is lost. 
The increased difficulty of recovering fees is also likely to 
diminish the market for legal services in special education 
cases. The whole purpose of the fee-shifting statutes is to en-
hance the availability of attorneys who will take on the litiga-
tion. Chipping away at the entitlement reduces the incentive 
for lawyers to allocate their time to special education cases 
rather than more lucrative matters. 
These policy implications of Buckhannon are simply specific 
applications of what can be expected to happen in public inter-
est litigation in general as a result of the case. A prominent le-
gal newspaper reported: 
The ruling will have a "profound adverse effect on the eco-
nomics of public interest litigation," says veteran environ-
mental litigator John Eccheverria of Georgetown University 
School of Law. "It will increase the risk that thousands of 
hours of legal time invested in a case will never be reim-
bursed even if the litigation in fact is successful and accom-
plished its objective." ... Plaintiffs' attorneys say that the rul-
ing gives defendants an incentive to drive litigation along, 
requiring plaintiffs' counsel to expend significant resources 
and then, at the 11th hour when plaintiffs appear likely to 
prevail, unilaterally change their policies to moot the litiga-
tion and avoid a fees award.65 
On the other side of the coin, there may be some positive 
impact on the availability of special education services if the 
school districts are currently withholding provision of services 
so that it does not look as though litigation caused them to give 
them to the child, thus creating the basis for a fees award.66 
Whether this incentive matters is dubious, however. Under the 
catalyst rule, the defendant always has an incentive to afford 
the relief to which the claimant is entitled in order to stop ac-
cumulating additional fees liability. 67 
65. Marcia Coyle, Fee Change i8 a Sea-Change, Nat!. L.J., AI (June 11, 2001). 
66. See Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1842 ("[T]he possibility of being assessed at-
torney's fees may well deter a defendant from altering its conduct."). 
67. See id. at 1859 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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If parents' attorneys make the predictable response of ap-
pending damages claims to their special education complaints, 
additional systemic results will ensue. Few things raise the 
tension in a lawsuit more than a claim for damages, and this is 
especially likely in the context of special education. Since bad 
faith conduct or gross misjudgment is a basis for the claim,68 
charges of personal misconduct are inevitable and will give rise 
to wounded feelings and lingering resentment. Subtle or less-
than-subtle retaliation may visit the child who continues in the 
school environment with the personnel who have been subject 
to the charges of bad faith and misconduct. 69 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The courts may not apply Buckhannon to special education 
litigation fee awards, but there is a clear likelihood that they 
will. If Buckhannon is adopted, the policy effects could be pro-
found, eroding the availability of legal services in an area in 
which Congress provided fee awards specifically to enhance the 
supply of legal counsel. As lawyers pursue damages claims and 
other more aggressive forms of relief, they may provide some 
insulation from claims of mootness but may create more an-
tagonistic relationships between parents and school districts. 
68. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
69. Long-term deterioration in the relationship between parents and school dis-
trict, with attendant potential harm to the child, is not unknown in special education 
disputes. In one case, the court ordered a child placed in a different school in the dis-
trict on account of the hostility between the personnel in the child's original school and 
the parents. Metro. Gout. u. Guest, 28 IDLER 290 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); see also Bd. of 
Educ. u. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming private placement 
in part on basis of parental hostility). 
